In modern research into niodal logic, niodal ternis are usually scmantically interprt:ted in terms of the niodel of possible worlds: ncccssary (N) = df true in all possible worlds itripossible ( -M ) = df'false in all possible worlds kiossibl<:
(M) = df true in at least one possible world contingent (K) = dl'irue in at least one possible world and falsc in at Icast On<: possible world. Now phi1osophc:rs havc thought about modal terrris, modal propositions and modal syllogisms long before the notion of possible worlds was enteriained. The question what interpretative model they used is a relevant one today. Jaako Hintikka and the circle of pupils and collcagues connected with hirn, in particular Simo Knuuttila, have tried to answer this qiiestion. 'I'hcy advancc thc following thcsis': undcrlying thc modal analysis proposed by Aristotle and the scholastic writers there appears, at 1t:ast in central sources2, a rriodel r>fniodality in which the modal terms are semantically interpreted like this: N = df always the casc (or: always truc) -M = df never the casc: (or: always falst:) M = df sometimes the case (or: sometimes ~r u e ) K = df sometimes the casc and somctimcs not thc case (or: sometirries true and sometimes false).
According to this, the modal terms arc intcrprctcd by rcfcrcnce to periods of time in ihr: history of this one real world. In contrast to the semantics of possible worlds, this interpretation woiild be reductionist.
In thc rcfcrcnce to alternative worlds the modal term 'possiblc' rcappears; it Counts as an irreducible basic term, and the definitions only set out the relations of thc othcr modal terms to the notion of possibility. Against this, when reference is made to time periods in this onc actual world lhc modal tcrms are removed frorn the dffinien.~. Thus in this thcory "modal notions are in the last analysis r(:duciblc to cxtensional terrns7'%.
A reduclionist lhcnry of quantification over time periods is not, strictly speaking, a modal thcory at all. Anyonc systeniatically interested in rnodal logic and analysis (:ould thcrcforc, if Hintikka arid Knuuttila wer<: right, leave Aristotle and the scholastics iinrcad; according to therri these wrilers offcr only attcmpts to abaridon the problem of modalitics altogcther.
I disputc thc correctriess ol'ttie (hesis which Hintikka and Knuuttila advance. In my opinion wc can learn a great deal about the problcms of modality froni Aristotle, Roethius and in particular Pcter Abelard, William of Shyreswood and 'I'homas Aquinas. Thc scholastics' analyscs pcrtain to the question what is meant when, in both cvcrydüy and scicntific lariguage, we describe somcthing as in thc real sense possible, impossible, ncccssary or (:ontintycnt4. One 01' iheir main thernes is prccisc rcflcction on thc differerice between iniensional and extensional language and on the relationship bctwccn these manriers of sp (:aking5 .
Tn the lirst part of the following investigation T shall preserit the thcsis put forward by Hintikka and Knuuttila, and my objcctions to ith. In the second part I shall expand my criticisms by ofTering a counterinterpretation. I shall takc u p the topic on which the authors rrientioned above have worked-the relationship between tense and modal qualifiers in Statements about events-and shall put forward my own interpretation of the scholastic analyses. This I shall do in the forrri of a systematising reconstruction in which rriy concern will bc to indicatc basic features, not to diflerentiate the contributions and positions of individual philosophers in a manner which is historically cxact at every point. Arthur Oncken Lovr.joy's 7'ht Crtat IJhnin oJ Btin,g7, appeared in 1936 and was reprintcd in 1950. According to Lovcjoy, thcrc is onc basic assumption at the rooi 01' the thinking of many of the philosophers in thc: Wr:stern traclition. This (:an t~r : t(:rm(:d thc 'prinsiple of plenitude', according to which nothing which is possible iri this world can rcmain unrcalis(:dY In that part of his investigation which concerns the early history of' this thought, Lovejoy puts forward the view that the principle of plenitude was accepted by Plato, but not by Aristotlc. At this point Hintikka cmphatically contradicts him.
Hintikka's and Knuuttila's researrh into Aristotle's modal theory and thc scholastic work conncctcd with it starts from the claim that Aristotle himself consciously presupposes this principlcy.
It is indisputable that Aristotlc docs not define the modal lerms by referencc to a totality of possiblc worlds; for hirri, what is possible is possible in this real world. Given this, it is the sc:(:ond sct of dcfinitions ol' the modal tcrms at the beginning of this papcr, to which Hintikka and Knuuttila rel'er as the 'statistical rriodel ol' niodality"", which exylicate thc "principle of plenitude". Morc cxactly, as Hintikka remarks", thc theses 'What is never the case is impossit~lc' 'What is always thc case is riecessary' 'What is possiblc is sorrietirnes the case' 'What is not nc(:cssary is sorrirtirrirs not the case' an: based ori the "prin(:ipl(: of plcriitude"; whereas thc oppositc implications 'What is impossible is never the rast:' 'What is necessliry is always th(: casc' 'What is sometimt:~ thc case is possiblr' 'What is somctirries riol the casc is not nc:(:(:ssary' are valid indepcndcntly of this principle.
(:an Hintikka and Kriuuttila provc t h a t Aristotlc arid the scholaslics until thc end 01' the 13th ccntiiry accept the "principle of plcnitu<l(:"? Hiritikka can show that Lovcjoy brinys no conclilsive proofto thc contrary. Th<: sources cited by I..ovejoyi2 allow not only ol'the interpretations 'Some possibilitics' or 'Every possibilily can remain for euer unrealisecl ' , hut alsci-ancl rriore plausibly -'Somc possibilitics' or Hirii ikka 95; Knuiittilii X . Cf'. tcio t h : iridict:~ on f'rinciple of f'lmifude. 'Every possibility can ~ornetzrnts remain ~n r c a l i s e d "~. Thus interprctcd, the sources are cornpatible with the principlc of plcnitude. Howevcr, Hintikka's atterrlpt tn press ttiese scntcnces liirthcr, so that they confirrn the validity of the principle, 'Every shcer possihility (contingency) will inJact bc realised at sorrie time'", is at least as forcible as Lovejoy's attempt to claim thern for the contrary thesis.
According to HintikkaI5 and Knuuttilaib, it is possible to clairn with regard to a passage in Metaph. Theta that "'l'his passagc clcarly shows liow thc assurril>tion that earh gcnuinc possihiliiy is realizril ai some monit-rit of time was oric 01' the prrsiippiisitions of Aristotlc's thiriking"17.
The passagc runs:
"ouk c*ntlcchctai aletliis i:inai io eipeiri lioti dunaton nic:ii todi, ouk estiii di:. hostc ta aduriata cinai taute diiil>hciigcin'' "Ii is not po~sil>l<. ihai it can t x triic to say, 'This is lic)ssiblc, hut will ncvcr be the rasc;' this wt>ill<l hc to rule oiit i r~i p~s s i b i l i t~" '~. Aristotle, Mctupli. 'l'heta 4, 1047 b 4-6. Ttitr English trarislation, on wtiii:h Hintikka and Kniiiittila basc their rrrriarks, runs: "11 cannot be triic to say that 'ttiis is possiblr but will not be', whicti would irnply thr disappcarancr ofirnpossihle things". R. T . McClelland (scc ri. 6) has receritly cxarninecl tliis passage, rclating it to Aristotle's discussions in Mefnph. Theta 3-4. He reactics thc concliision thai Aristotlr ilocs not accept ttic 'principle of p1i:nitudc' (146, 147). He translatcs the passagc in question, like G.E.L. Owen and Martha Knealr t>trli>rc hirn, as Lillows: "It <:annot bc true to say that this is possible Iiut will not happen aiid to say this io such elli:ct that the existence ol' tlii: impossible will cscape us in this way" (131, 146). Mi:Clclland paraphrascs this in orck:r ro niake Aristotlc's arpmeritativc intentiori i:ltrarcr: "If 'ttic possible' ie as we tiave deecribed it-or, is derivablc linrn what wc havc said-. it is clrarly thc rase that it cannot be true to say of any givcn thing 'this is now capablt: of happening but it never will happen', iritiinding by such rncans to rriakr of 'the irripossible' an trriipty Iocution of which therr iirc no inslances" (146). Cf. Soratji (see n. 6) 136: "Kneale iind Owcn suggest that Aristotle is not objccting to a clcnial of the ~irinci-ple of I>lcniiudc, but oiily to a ccrtain rrioral rnispidedly drawn fmtn thc denial. Ttic rnistiiken rnoral is that whai. ncver hapkiens is in eu-y cusc possible. . ..As S. Mansiori points out ( L e , / u p e n t dJKxi.rfmce chez Anitufe, 2e Cd., 1.ouvain 1976, n. 13), if the Passage is inrcrpreted iri this way, it artiiatly gocs against. thc ascription to Aristotlr cif thc principle of plrriitudc. k'or in resisting ihe idea that all t h i n g wtiich fail to happen are possiblc, Aristotle will bc allowing that .som rhings wh~ch never happcn are noncHintikka and Knuuttila clearly read this sentence as a Statement about the inconsistency of a particular corribination of truth-values: 'The proposition, "Something is possible and will never be the case", cannot be true'; this can be formalised as ' -M(Mpc -%(F)-t))'. Read in this way, the sentence really does presuppose the principle of plcnitudc; it allows of tht: t:quivalcnt reformulation, "l'hi: proposition, "If sorriething is possible, it is sorrietirries the case", is necessarily true3-forrnalised as 'N(M~--B;(~-~))'. However, I suggest another intcrpretation. According to my rcading, thc scntencc quotcd hcrc has nothing to do with the contentious principle. Aristotlc is not iri the least concerncd with the qucstion whether the truth values ofpropositions rcprcscntablc by variables are compatihle with each other. Rather, he is disputing the reliability of ihe Sollowing prognostication: 'This is possible, but will never be the case'. Anyone who advances claims about particular cvcnts must bc prepared to justify thest: claims in argument. The prediction, 'This will never be the case', which covcrs the wholt: of futurt: timc, could bc justificd by, 'This is not possible'. And if anyone says about a particular event, 'This is possible', he ought to be in a position to advance reasons For which ii mighi occur". I agree with Hintikka when he writes of this passage20, "Aristotle . .. warns us against assuniing that sorriething is possible but will never lie". But I disputt: tht: contcntion that this mmns thc samt: as, 'Aristotle tells us that whatever is possible will be the case'.
In other cases too ihe apparent corroborative force ol' the sources cited hy Hintikka and Knuuttila in support oi'their thesis disappears as soon as one investigates which question is actually being discussed in the tcxt conccrncd. In answcr to the question, 'What do we understand by "It is pcissiblc"?' the reply, 'It is sometimes the casc', is false. And none of the authors examined by Flintikka and Knuuttila does give this reply". Howevcr, in answer to the quiie diffcrent quesiion ' O n what is the claim based that this is possilile'? the reply 'Something of tht: sort is the case or has been the case, and it cannot be ruled out that it will occur again', is pcrfcctly appropriatc. or has beeri the case in orrlcr to deline 'possibilily', but in ordcr to justil'y siihstantive claims about particular possihilities. Corresponding observations apply to tlie olher moclal lerms.
The conncction bctwceri modal and tense qualiliers is not a matter ol'definition but one of argumentation. If somcone says, 'This is possible', he has siifficiently supported his claini if he can show that states of aflairs of the sanie t.ypc as that to which he is rcferririg somctirries do occur. If he says, 'This is not ncccssary ( = possibly not)' he has sufficicntly support(:d his claim if he can show that statcs OS affairs of the same type as that to which he is rcfcrring somctirries do not occur. Neithcr case prcsupposes irriplications such as 'If possiblc, then sometimes thc case' ('Only wtieri sornctirries ~h c case, then possible'), or 'If possible that not the casc, then sometimcs not thc case' ('Only if sometimes not the casc, theri possiblc that not t.hc case'). l'hc argument takcs placc, rather, ac:cording. io the schcma, 'Becausc somctirries thc c:ase, thereforc possible', or 'Becausr: sometimes not the casc, thereforc possible that not ihe case'. C:laims about the ncccssity or th(: irripossihility of somc state ot' affairs cannot bc supportcd by refcrcnce io cxperiences nor to interpolatioris and cxtrapolations gcneralising aboiit thcrri. The argumentative relationship betwecn statcrrients containing modal and time qualiliers is reversed hcrc. Jf soriieonc says, "l'his is always th(: c:asel, he is clairiiing that his statcment is valid for future tirne as well. He has adequately supported his <:laim if he (:an show that thc state of affairs conccrned bclongs to a type to which neccssity pertains. If he says, "This is nevcr the casc', hc has adcquately supported his claim if he can show that the statc: of' affairs conccrried bclongs to a type wliich is impossible in itself. Arguing in these ways, orie does not presuppse irriplications such as, 'If always the casc, then nt:c:cssary' ('Only if' neccssary, then always thc case'), or 'If never thc case, ttien impossible' ('Only il'impossible, then never thc case'). 7'hc argurnent runs, rather, according to the scherria 'Bccause neccssary, thereforc always ihc case', or 'Bccause irnpossiblc, therefort: ncver the <:asc'.
The thescs which Sollow from the "principle of pleriitudc'' do not occur in thc schemata I have given. Both refert:nccs to what is actually the case and timc rcferences arc coriipletcly out ofplacc when wc wish to cxplicatc what is rrieant by 'possihlc', 'coritingcnt', 'impossible' and 'necessary'. Thomas Aquinas expressly refuses to define, as well as to differentiate, the modal terms by rel'erencc to what will bc the case. Attemptcd definitions of this sort, he says, are "incompetent".
Modal terrns should not be defincd "a poslcriori" and "externally", but interisionally, by rcfcrcnce to that io which a thing "is dctcrmined by its Ir1 ordcr to cxplain why he attaches the term "a fiosteriori" to thc suggested delinitioris, 'That is impossible which will never bc thc casc', "l'hai is possible (in thc scnsc of "coniingeni") which will someiimes be the case and sornetirnes not', Thomas adds, I ' For sonirthing is not ncccssnry hc<-;iils<. it will alw;iys he thr rase; it will always br the case becausc i i is ii<.cc*ssary; arid rlriirly thc same applics io ihc o1hi.r (att<:rriptc<i drfinitions)' "'.
Knuuttila has disciissed this passage2'. According to him, if Thomas had followed his thought through io the erid he would havc had to say-correspondingly to what h(: has said about thr conccpt of necessity-that somcthing is not contingent bccaust: it will sometimes be ihe case and somctimes not; ii will sorrietirncs bc thc casc and somctimes not hecause it is contingc:ni. And this would be to give possihiliiy as a sufficicnt rcason for soniething's bring thc case on oc:casion-thai is, it would )I(: to advance whai ihe "principle of plenitude" advances. Hut ii seerris t o rric that Knuiitiila is looking here in vain for corroboration for his owii iriterpretation. Thomas argucs as hllows against the atiempted defiriitions I havc siirnmarised: even $in all thcsc dcfiniiions both sides were <:quivalrnt; if, ihai is, ii were valid not only to say, 'If impossible, ihen ne\.er thc casc', but also 'If never thc casc, ihen impossible'; not only, 'If necessary, then always the case', but also ' Tf always the case, then nc:c:(:ssary'; not only to rnake thc con.jiinction of thr transposiiions t'or the lirst pair of irriplications, ' 11' not ncvcr ( = soineiimes) arid not always the case, then contingcnt', but also 'If conting(:nt, then sonietimes the case and sornctimes not'; even this would bc irrelevant to the delinition of the modal terms. This passagc will not do Sor testirig which irnplications l'homas recognises bctwccn modal and tense Statements. Thomas's argurrientativc: intention is preciscly to t:xpt:l references to what is actually the casc-whether always o r riever or somctimcs and somctimcs not-frorri definitions of modal terms. As he ollen does elsewhere, hcrc too 'I'honias makes all possiblc admissions to his opponents in ordcr to bring ihe controversy to its dccisivc point:
Hintikka and Knuuttila quote, paraphrasc or nanie parts of texts, but only in cxceptional cases2' d o they analyse whole Patterns of' argument. More usually thcy omit to consider thc subject ol'clebate in cach of the contexts from which their exc:crpts are taken. 'l'hcrc are, though, relevant diffcrcnces between them. One oT the formulations in which Hintikka perceives the principle of plenitude runs as follows: 'Nothing eternal is contingent'". This scntence is, in fact, Aristotle'sw. Hut Hintikka appears to overlook the fact that Aristotlc only uses the word 'aidios'-'eterna1'-for events in thc heavenly sphere; the sentence quoted here has no application to the sublunary world. It cannot hc understood as a principlc: of tense or modal logic, but as a substantive principle of a specific scicnce, that of celcstial physics. The convcrsion of this sentence, 'Nothing contingent is etcrnal', can be taken as a valid rule in earthly physics insofar as its principles can basically only claim to apply to that which occurs as a r~l e~~.
T o surrimarise: there is no single lext namcd by I-Jintikka or Knuuttila in which Aristotle or Abelard or Thomas directly support the principlc of plenitude or expressly accept the "statistical" intcrprctaticin of modal terms. Where the semantic intcrpretation of modal terms is in question, it is, rathcr, continually emphasised that thcsc terms are not reducible. In most of the texts quotcd by Hintikka and Knuuttila it is claimed only that in our substantive speech about particular possibilities wc remain bound to what can he cxpericnccd-that is, to what is at sonie time thc case. This has nothing to do either with the principle ol' plenitudc or with a statistical interpretation of rriodal terms. In the rernaining rcfererices it might be investigated what is bcing discussed in thc surrounding contexts, so as to discover undcr which conditions a reductionist intcrpretation of modal terms might bc atlmissible.
'I'hc Problclii: Logical Determinisrri
Hintikka"%nd KnuilttilaJ4 also advance as onc place in which the principle of pleriitude is applied the famous sentence from De Znt. c.9": i C to tnen nun einai to on hnfan Z, kui to mF on rne einai holan mt? C, ana,ckF"-"Necessarily, what is, is, when it is; and what is not, is not, wheri it is not". This sentence can be regarded as followirig liom thc principle in qiiestion only on condition that it is postulated that it is valid not only for types of cvent, but also ior individual o n e~. '~ I consider it quitc irnprohable that Aristotle a<:c:c:pts the principlc in this extreme H e would, if' he did so, have to admit that it applicd also ta events distinguished not by dating but by qualifiers of qiiality, placc or position.
I shall rriake clear latcr how I understand the contentious sentence; first I shall continue to examiric the steps takcn by Hintikka and Knuuttila. The sentence, as thcy understand it, is a deterministic one:
"Hcnce all statrnirnts a h u i cvcnts that artb individual in thr scrisr ol'heing tied to a partiriilar rrioriicrit of timr, will bi: cithcr nccrssarily truc or nccessarily fal~e"~".
According to thcsc authors, Aristotlf: bclicved, though, that he could render tliis dctcrrriinism harmlcss by emphasising thc dillerence hctween 'necessary that p at time to' and 'ncccssary that p'.
De Inlerprefationr, Oxford 196:3), ihc sentencr is rcndcrcd, 'What is, nccessarily is, when it is; anti what is riot. riccessarily is riol. when it is not'. Hintikka quotirs ihis iranslation, 1)iit. with slightly dtcrcd punctiiatiori: "What is nri.cssarily is, wheri it is; and w b a~ is not necrssar.ily is not, wtitrri it is not" (156). In Hintikka -Rcmcs -
Knuuttila tlic punctuatiori is as follows: "What is, necessarily is when it is; iintl what is not, nc:i:i:ssarily is not wticn it is not" (44).
A Lorinal proof, wliich Hintikka iintl Knuuttila do ricii prnvide but irisicad repliice witti li,rinulations siicti as 'seems to ii,llow' (Knuuttila 166), could be givirn as follows: Givcn:
This assumpiion cari, according to ttic laws of rnodal and predicatc logic, be trarisformed into tlic c:quivalent
By counterposition find transforrrialiori, valid iri riiodal logic, this yii:lds:
From this, t>y substituting p-ti / -(p-1;):
" Hintikka claims (160) tliat Aristotle rxpi-i:ssly presup1,osi:s ihc axiom 'l>ossibility cquals sorriiitiinc truth' iii ße Int. 9, antl as proof of this hc quoies the sentcnce, ' C hommrn gar ... hoti holos estiri cn iois me aei iirii:r.gousi to diinatori cinai kai mC" -"We sei: tliat ... in things that arc not alwilys actual there is ttit: possibility of h i n g and not bcing" (19 a 9-11). This argiimcnt is Siiulty. In 'What is riot always actual is contingerit' thc principle of' plenitude is, as Hintikka himself rcmarks elsewhcrc ('Jöf.), noi iinplied. ' -V I (p-t) --N p' can bc ti.ansbrmed, ii<:cording to the laws of propositional anti modal lo@i. arid hy suhstitutir~~ p-I. / -(p-t),,into the equiva1i:rit ".&I t (11-1) -M P'; but c.>rily '3 t (p-t) -M p' is deperi<lcrii. on Hintikka's postulated principle. Kniiutiila presents lluns Scotiis's new rriodal thcory as "Duns Scotus' Criticisni of t.hc Statistical Intcrprctaiion of M~d a l i t y "~~. Here I agree with Knuuttila's account at irnportant points. Duns Scotus dcvclops ihe basic traiis of a theory of possible worlds, and indeed does so iri thc coursc of critical commt:nts on the claims of his predecessors. But I tio not h(:lic:vc thai ihis argumeni proceeds exactly as Knuuttila dcscrihcs. I i seems io me [hat ii is not his preseritation of' Duris Scoius's positiori which is rriistakcn, t~u t rathcr his vicw of that from which Scoius disiances hiniself'. I cannot set out here thc points which I do Lclicvc n u n s S(:otiis to attack-1 shall make sorne remarks on ihis a t the crid of this papcr. At prcscnt I shall contcnt mysclf with drawing attcntion to ihe Sollowing. Duns Scotus quotcs the Aristotcliari seritericc frorri De Znterpretalinne. 'l'his scntcn(:<:, 'Omnt. quod es1 quando t..rl, 63-t n6~-essarium', is susccptiLlc of two intcrprctations. Tak<:n secundum diuisinnem, it appcars as a conditional scnience, whose sense Kniiiitiila corrcctly construcs as "Whc:n<:v<:r somcthing is, it then necessarily is". T a k m ihiis, the senicnce is Ialse. Interpreted secundum cnmpnsitionem, it is a rritcgorical scnience, construed rorrectly by Knutittila, 
4"~~iiiittil;i
when hc puts it, "Ncccssarily everyihing is whcri it is". lntcrprctcd thus, the scntcnce is t r~e '~. Thcrc is, therefore, an intcrpretation of this disputcd, purportedly dcterniinistic sentcncc, accordirig to which the sentencc has no cleterministic implications and is perl'ectly iruc. And nor is this interprctation connected with the theory of possiblc worlds. How shoiild it bcl' ISthe generalisation to what can takc: place at other timcs in this world supplics no real avoidancc of logical detcrrninism, thcn neither does thc generalisaiion to what can happen at thc same tirne in diffcrcnt worlds. Now Duns Scotus does not succeed in givirig this scntcnce a triie sense, frcc of determinism, by virtue 0l.a new scmantic theory; he does so by means of a simple syritactic distinction. This, thc distinction bctwcen readings .recundum compositionem and secundum diutstonem, sterris ti-om Aristotlc4", and is an instniment farniliar io Hocthius ancl the s c h o l a~t i c s~~. Might it not bc plausible to claim that Aristotle himsclf' and his interprctcrs before Duns Scotus also intended this scntence to bear thc construction according to which it is true? And cqually plausible to claim that it n w c r was deduced frorri any such postulated presupposition as tlie "principlc of plenitudc"? occasionally to oihcr typcs of sentencc and scliolasiic accounts of them; when I do mcntion these, it will be with the interition of marking thc distinction between thcm and the typc of sentencr. ccntral to the discussion. In scholasti(: works, the standard example for staternents about particular events is thc sentence, ' .S' ocrates sed&'-'Socratcs is sitting'. Here 'Socratcs' does not refcr to the historical Socrates, but to any arbitrarily s(:l(:cted individiial, thought of as cxisting at the prcscnt tirne. For thc sake ol'simplicity I shall use the samc standard examplc.
2. Sentences about particular cvcnts are analyscd in terms of propositional and of assertoric clcrncrits. The thought cxpressed in thc 4 7 Knuuttila 229.
Cf. Hintikka -Rcrrics -Knuuttila 48-50; Kriiiuttila 168.
Cf. Knuutti1;i l641:, 176, 179f., 188f.. 191-195, 214, 221 . 5U Cf. Hintikka 64, 150 n. 6. sentence 'Socrates is sitting', its propositaonal content (dictum propositionis), is 'that Socrates is sitting' ('Socratem sedere'), or, substan- When such staterrients are discuss<:d-as thcy are by logicians-particular attention is paid to somcthing which is prcsupposed, automatically and thcrcforci tacitly, in a speech siiuation: that the reference to tlie situation in which a staterricnt is rnadc is part of the statement. 'Socrates is sitting', said at different tirnes, may somctimes be true and sometimcs falsc. Thc truth-valuc of statements like this is dependent on their time OS utterance; it is, so to spcak, unstablc.
It is our habit to makc Statements more precise by dating theni. Instead of indicating thc situation of uiierancr, we choose fixed times of ihe clock and calsndar as reference p~i n t s~~. The truth-values of statcmcnts datcd in this way are, of Course, stable. Riit the fact that Aristotlc arid the scholasiics pro<:<:cd differeritly does noi detract frnm the worth of'their analyscs, wtiich deal with thc: morc: complex type OS case. Sincc thc transitiori I'r.otii the morc cnmplcx to tlie sirnpler is always easicr than thc other way round, thcir analyscs are also instrurtive for thosc who are interestcd in a logic ol' dated statements.
'I'hc "tokeri rellexive", 'now, at the tirrie I ani saying this', is not iniplicit only in statcmcnts in the present tensc, but also iri staterrients whose prctlicatcs are in the past or thc future. The past is what happcned belore now; thc futurc is what will happen aftcr now.
4. How should wc analysc statcrrients aboiit the past or about the futurc? Should the tense qualificr bc counted as (1) part of thc assertoric aspect or (2) part of thc propositional content of a statcment? In the tirst casc, 'is the case (triie)' can bc made rnore precise by a tensc operator:
'1i was-earlier thiin riciw-ihi: c:asc (iruc) thai Socrates is sitting' $11 is-now-thr <:;ist. (trilc) ihai Socraics is sitiing'. '11 will bc-later thari riuw-tht: casc (truc) that Socrates is sitting'
In the second casc onc would assign a "time ~ignification"~~ to the verb in the dzctum proposztionis: 'Socmttm .rtdoro9 would have ariother mcaning than 'Sucratem se/iis.tc' or 'Socratem sedentemfure'. 'I'hc modcl of analysis would be:
'11 is the riisr (triii.) itiai S<i<.i.atcs was siiting-eürlier thari now' '11 is thr ras< (truc) thai Socraics 1s siiting-now 'It is the casr (triic) ihai Socraics will be sitting-latrr ttian iiow ' Closcr cxamination shows that the question which rriodel of analy& to follow has not. yet bccn quitt. correctly put. 1i is in fact tci bc rccorrimendcd that orie shoiild follow both. For a statenient of type (1)-'There was a pciint in tirrie at wliich it was true to say, "S is P" ', does indecd havc the sarne truth-value as thc type (2) Statement, 'It is riow true to say, "S was P" '; but these two statemcnts arc not saying exactly thc sanie thing. T o put it evcn morc carefully and niore preciscly: thcy are accentuating the samc thing in dil'i'erent ways. In the first case thc spcakcr situates hirnselt; so to spcak, in another period in time, ficirri which he makes a statcmcnt in the present tense; in tloing so he draws attenticin to thc iristability oi' such Statements about particular cvcnts. In thc sccond case, however, the truth-valuc sccms relatively stable: if it is now thc case that 'S' was 'P', then it will Arisioile: 1)e Inl. c.3, 16 b 6. bc thc case at cvery future rnotricrit that 'S' was 'P'. I Want to try to clarify this distinction by showing wiih what instruirirnts thc mcdicval logicians analysed tcnscd statcmcnts.
(1) In statcmcnts ahoiit the past, wc should bcar in mind the distinction bctwt:cn talking aboiit sorrieorie who cxistcd in thc past and onc of his actions or statrs, antl talkirig about an carlicr astion or statt.
of sorrieone who still cxists now. In the I'or1rit.r case thc sub-jcct tcrm stands (as well, at any rate) for somcthing in the past; ttic tcnsc quafificr brings aboui aii extendetl rangt. oT refercncc (ampliatiu suppositlonlJ-). T h e tensc Operator (1ctcrrnint:s thc stateiiient as a wholc (sensu composi~o); acijusting the graniniar to erriphasisc thc: scnse, this gives, 'This was thc casc: Sorrates exists and he is sitting'. In the latter case, thc sub.jct:t tcrm stands for sorriething in thc present; the tense opcrator dctcrmincs, .ccnsu diuisv, orily thc v(:rt) of action or state: 'It is tiow the case that Soc:rat(:s cxists and was earlier the case that hc: is sitting"? -'Ibis distinction is derr~andcd by thc analysis of' tensrd statetnents I gavc first, at.(:ording to which thr tirne reSercn(:(: is extractcd l'rorri tlie fitum proposifioni.~ and coiiiited as part of thc stat(:m(:ntal aspect. 'I'he dictum is split up into various parts; for each part ofthe staietrir.nt's contcnt it has to bt: decided whether to assign it. a truth-valuc Sor thc prcscnt moment of tinie or for sorrie carlicr onc.
(2) Statcmcnts in tlie prrsrrit tcrise express what is or is not the case at thc rriorricnt of uttcring thcni. Statrnirnts in the past tcnsc, though, do not apply only at the triorricrits of tirnc: at which they are made. Both thc stateinent, 'Socratcs was sitting', and the Statement, 'Socrates was staridirig, so hc: was not sitting', can indeed bc truc ' L now7', if thc: prrson inakiny thrrri is refcrring to statcs of afrairs whic:h havt: oc:c:urrt:d at different tinies iri thc past But if the stateinent, 'Socrates is sitting', has cvcr at any time been triie, the statemc:nt, 'Soc:ratc:s was sitting' ( = 'It is thc casc that at some moment of iitrie earlier than this onc Soc:rates was siiiing') is valid for all sut>S(:-quent rriotrients oftirric. Statc:m(:nts in the past tense are, theri, valid Sor the wholc pcriod of time tollowing the rrionierit in which th(: corresponding present statcmcnt is true, I'he dill'erence between thc "short-livcdW5~ qilality of Statements in thc present tense and thc "long-lived" quality oS those in the past tense is easier to pcrccivc in that analysis OS tensed statements which distinguishes propositional contcnts iri tcrms of thcir tcnscs than in thc account I presented first. The scholastics recognise the distinction when they say that statements ahout thc: past arc, if thcy arc truc, ncccssary Per accidens. In order to makc clcar thc cxact sense of this cxpr(:ssion it is necessary at least briefly to look at the function of modal qualifiers in general. Before I do so, I should like to makc one more remark. It is logically quite unpmblematic to transier the accounts we have now achieved for statements about the past to statements about the future and to say something like, 'Once the statement, "Socrates is sitting", is at some moment of time true, the statement, "Socrates will be sitting", is valid for all preceding morrients of But it is qucstionahle whether such a transfcrencc would bc sensible. The medieval thinkers hold that long-term prognoscs about particular events are possible if at all only in a s t r o n o~r i y~~, so in this type of analysis, wherc spcaking about the Suture is concerned, the hiddenness OS the future is usually <:mphasised. The transference I have rnentioncd bccom(:s a scrious subjcct of discussion, however, with regard to thc qucstion of God's preknowledge.
5. For mcdieval logicians, modal logic is not a spccial arca of thc: discipline. For them, rather, it is an essential part ol' deterniining the sense o f any sentence at all to give its rnodalily, whether or not modal tcrms ovcrtly occur in it. Modal tcrrris serve to dctcrminc tht: way in which subject and predicate are linked in a statement. In giving the rnodality one makes clear in what way the statement should be counted as true or Salse.
Whenever logical Operators arc: part of a statement, it is necessary to detcrminc their rangc of' applicatiori, by syntactic analysis of' their logical structure. The distinction between sensu composito and sensu diuiso is an aid to doing this. When several syncategorernata occur together, it must also be determined which OS them is the "inclusive" and which the "included", that is, the one which falls inside the range of application of the inclusive one.
6. The basic distinction in niedieval logic is that between statements which are either nccessarily truc or neccssarily false, on the
